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THE DEATH OF NON-RESIDENT CONTRIBUTION LIMIT BANS
AND THE BIRTH OF THE NEW SMALL, SWING STATE
George J. Somi*
INTRODUCTION
New Hampshire’s 1st Congressional District race in 2018 featured an eye-popping
number: 96.7.1 That figure represents the percentage of candidate Maura Sullivan’s
individual contributions derived from out-of-state, non–New Hampshire donors.2 In
August 2018, of the $1.37 million USD of individual contributions that Sullivan had
raised, only 3.3%—$46,648 USD—originated from in-state contributors.3 Sullivan
had received individual donations amounting to $497,405 USD from Boston, $216,359
USD from New York City, $101,562 USD from the Washington, D.C. metropolitan
area, and $92,371 USD from San Francisco.4
In nearby Maine, campaign finance reports filed on October 15, 2019, with the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) indicate that the Pine Tree State’s 2020 Senate
race will be a national battleground.5 According to the independent regulatory agency,
out-of-state donors to the campaigns of Republican Senator Susan Collins and Demo-
crat Sara Gideon constitute the majority of contributions of $200 USD or more
between July 2019 and September 2019.6 So far, Maine residents have made up only
7% and 18.5% of all $200-plus individual contributions to Collins and Gideon, re-
spectively.7 The largest percentage of individual donations exceeding the $200 USD
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comments and encouragement. I would like to thank my wonderful parents, Rita and Joseph,
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1 See Rick Green, Sullivan Gets More than 96 Percent of Individual Contributions from
Out of State, LACONIA DAILY SUN (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.laconiadailysun.com/news
/local/sullivan-gets-more-than-percent-of-individual-contributions-from-out/article_4a38b
3da-a622-11e8-bec6-4f05ffb3a1aa.html [https://perma.cc/NR7X-9589].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See Kevin Miller, Out-of-State Donors Flood Maine’s Closely Watched U.S. Senate Race,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Oct. 27, 2019), https://www.pressherald.com/2019/10/27/money
-from-away-piles-up-in-u-s-senate-race/ [https://perma.cc/D2BW-PQUE].
6 Id.
7 Id.
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reporting threshold to both campaigns stem from California and New York.8 While
both candidates are seeking big-dollar donors nationally,9 smaller-donor, online dona-
tions are becoming increasingly common and crucial in close, pivotal races like this.
Approximately one thousand miles westward, in Wisconsin, incumbent Governor
Scott Walker had raised $11.5 million USD from out-of-state donors through early
October 2018.10 He was one of three 2018 gubernatorial candidates—in Wisconsin,
Pennsylvania, and New York—who raised at least $5.5 million USD from across
state lines.11 While non-resident campaign contributions constituted up to 10% of
direct gubernatorial fundraising across the United States as a whole, these three
aforementioned gubernatorial candidates raised between 18% and 50% of their cam-
paign funds from out-of-state contributions.12 These figures cannot be ignored because
state legislatures and governors not only establish laws and policies impacting their
local constituencies, but also draw up the very congressional maps that have massive
repercussions for national politics.13
While both Sullivan and Walker ultimately lost their races, their campaigns
demonstrate that political engagement across state lines has become a noteworthy
development in pivotal federal elections like Maine’s 2020 U.S. Senate race, state-level
races, and campaign finance law as a whole.14 Today, despite various efforts by states
to legislate restrictions on out-of-state campaign contributions, only Hawaii main-
tains such laws.15 This Article, therefore, seeks to analyze the latest developments
in campaign finance laws pertaining to state residency-based limits, especially in
8 Id.
9 See id.
10 See Rui Kaneya & Joe Yerardi, Out-of-State Donors Pour Cash into Democrats’ State
Races, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 10, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://publicintegrity.org/state-po
litics/out-of-state-donors-pour-cash-into-democrats-state-races/ [https://perma.cc/H8NP-2W34].
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 See Ella Nilsen, Republicans Dominate State Legislatures. That Decides Political Power
in America., VOX (July 5, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/7
/5/20680124/state-legislatures-gerrymandering-redistricting [https://perma.cc/FC3L-FTKX].
In Virginia, Democrats raised millions of dollars more than Republicans in out-of-state cash en
route to flipping the historically Republican-controlled state legislature on November 5, 2019.
See Patricia Cason, Virginia Democrats Outraise Republicans in Out-of-State Donations,
WHSV (Oct. 28, 2019, 11:52 AM), https://www.whsv.com/content/news/Virginia-Demo-
crats-outraise-Republicans-in-out-of-state-donations-563981081.html [https://perma.cc/F4
AC-PL3S]. Democrats’ success in these state races has opened the possibility that Virginia will
be the thirty-eighth and final state needed to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment, which has
been dormant for decades. See Russell Berman, The Equal Rights Amendment Is an Artifact
No More, ATLANTIC (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/11/vir
ginia-equal-rights-amendment-women-constitution/601609/ [https://perma.cc/4GV5-CCJD].
14 See Miller, supra note 5; see also Kaneya & Yerardi, supra note 10.
15 See infra Section II.D.
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swing states. It posits that while smaller, swing states may disproportionately impact
the national political landscape, the prospect of increased out-of-state fundraising
could allow citizens of larger, inelastic16 states to heavily impact those races and
guide the disproportionate influence of citizens in those smaller states.
Part I of this Article will provide a brief history of individual contribution limits
in federal campaign finance law, starting with the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971. It will analyze the impact of Supreme Court cases like Buckley v. Valeo,
Citizens United v. FEC, and McCutcheon v. FEC on this nation’s campaign finance
jurisprudence, particularly with respect to individual contributions.17 Part II will lay
out a case study of the four states that have dared to pass laws limiting individual
out-of-state contributions—Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, and Vermont.18 It will analyze
the arguments and holdings of influential Second and Ninth Circuit cases, including
VanNatta v. Keisling, Landell v. Sorrell, and most recently, Thompson v. Hebdon.19
Part III will explore a chief argument raised in favor of limiting out-of-state campaign
contributions—the protection of republicanism. It proceeds to explore the confusion
of defining an elected official’s “constituent”—a challenge that complicates any
recognition of an interest to preserve separate, state-specific political communities
in the campaign finance law context. This Part also explores the surrogate represen-
tation that a non-resident donor may seek and how this impacts politics outside the
constituent’s home state. Finally, Part IV will adopt statistician Nate Silver’s notion
of “elasticity” to demonstrate a basic example of how a concerted effort by out-of-
state individual donors could one day be strategically directed to states that have
transformed into platforms for national political struggles.20
This Article does not pretend to ignore the unprecedented flow of money from
political action committees (PACs) and super PACs, which may trump individual
out-of-state contributions.21 Nevertheless, it is still a worthwhile exercise to examine
the rising influence of these individual contributions, especially if reforms curbing
or eliminating the influence of PACs and super PACs are enacted in the future.
16 For a discussion on state elasticity in the context of elections, see infra Section IV.B.
17 See infra Part I.
18 See infra Part II.
19 See infra Part II.
20 See infra Part IV.
21 For more on the rising concern pertaining to the influence of PACs and Super PACs’
influence in elections, see generally R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R42042, SUPER
PACS IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: OVERVIEWS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2016); Albert W.
Alschuler et al., Why Limits on Contributions to Super PACs Should Survive Citizens United,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2299 (2018); Michael D. Gilbert & Samir Sheth, Super PACs and the
Market for Data, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Nov. 2, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org
/super-pacs-and-the-market-for-data/ [https://perma.cc/7ZMF-4Q2Z]. For a defense of Super
PACs, see generally Joel M. Gora, In Defense of “Super PACs” and of the First Amendment,
43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1185 (2013).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS IN
FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
The genesis of modern campaign finance reform requires an understanding of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).22 The United States Congress passed
FECA—the first comprehensive attempt to address federal campaign spending—to
stop the rising costs of federal election campaigns.23 In 1974, in the aftermath of the
Watergate scandal, Congress passed amendments to FECA that represented the tough-
est campaign-measure regulations legislated by Congress.24 The 1974 FECA amend-
ments limited the amount of money that individuals, political committees, and political
parties could directly give to candidates running for federal office25 (these are referred
to as contributions limits).26 In addition, the new provisions limited expenditures,
or “spending money on behalf of a [particular] candidate.”27 The FECA amendments
placed limits on personal spending by candidates; enacted ceilings on overall spending
for federal offices; limited what groups not affiliated with a campaign or candidate
could independently spend; and set up the FEC to enforce and administer public
financing for presidential candidates.28
In 1976, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of FECA, particularly
under the lens of the First Amendment,29 in Buckley v. Valeo.30 In Buckley, the Court
upheld FECA’s limits on contributions, while overturning the Act’s independent
expenditure ceiling.31 Buckley addresses the government interest “in equalizing the
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections” when
addressing FECA’s expenditure ceiling.32 The Court held:
22 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 52 U.S.C.).
23 See id.; Jon Simon Stefanuca, The Fall of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971:
A Public Choice Explanation, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 238 (2008).
24 See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1055 (1996); see also R. SAM GARRETT, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41542, THE STATE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY: RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2–4 (2018) (summarizing the history of FECA).
25 See Smith, supra note 24, at 1055.
26 See id.
27 Ben Wallace, A Vote Against State Nonresident Contribution Limits, 78 LA. L. REV.
597, 602 (2018).
28 See Smith, supra note 24, at 1055.
29 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.”).
30 See generally 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
31 See id. at 58.
32 Id. at 48.
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[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was de-
signed “to secure ‘the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources,’” and “‘to assure unfet-
tered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.’”33
Buckley opposes the restriction of free speech rights of some so as to create a more
level playing field between different voices.34 Therefore, enforcing a system that
undercuts some people’s ability to engage in political expression is a violation of the
First Amendment.35
In addition, in Buckley, the Supreme Court states that “limit[ing] the actuality
and appearances of corruption resulting from large individual financial contribu-
tions” is the “primary purpose” of FECA.36 According to the Court, “To the extent
that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo . . . the integrity
of our system of representative democracy is undermined.”37 Of almost equal concern
to the Court is the avoidance of the appearance of corruption, as it “is also critical . . .
if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a
disastrous extent.”38 Therefore, Buckley not only justifies FECA’s limitations on
contribution, but it also qualifies an interest against corruption as a goal.39
Decades later, in Citizens United v. FEC, the Court reviewed federal laws barring
corporations and unions from making independent expenditures.40 In this case, the
Court embraces political speech as “indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy”
regardless of “the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or
individual.”41 Citizens United rejects the anti-distortion rationale,42 holding that
33 Id. at 48–49 (first quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266–69 (1964);
then quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
34 Id. at 49 n.55 (“Neither the voting rights cases nor the . . . fairness doctrine [case] lends
support to [the] position that the First Amendment permits Congress to abridge the rights of
some persons to engage in political expression in order to enhance the relative voice of other
segments of our society.”).
35 See, e.g., Whitmore v. FEC, 68 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Such management
of the system of political expression [where an injunction is issued to prohibit congressional
candidates from accepting out-of-state contributions by individuals] may violate the rights
of the out-of-state contributors.”).
36 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
37 Id. at 26–27.
38 Id. at 27 (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 565 (1973)).
39 See id. at 26–27.
40 See generally 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
41 Id. at 349 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
42 “[T]he antidistortion rationale [is] a means to prevent [individuals or entities like]
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“[t]he First Amendment’s protections do not depend on the speaker’s ‘financial
ability to engage in public discussion.’”43 Instead, the Supreme Court, while hear-
kening back to Buckley, declared that the only “‘sufficiently important’ governmen-
tal interest” was quid pro quo corruption.44 Furthermore, just because a contributor
or voter has influence or access to an elected official does not meet the definition of
quid pro quo corruption.45
Four years later, in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Supreme Court held that FECA’s
aggregate limits on individual campaign contributions do little to further the govern-
ment’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of corruption
and violate the First Amendment.46 According to the late Justice John Paul Stevens,
the McCutcheon case fails to clearly “tell the reader that the petitioner was only com-
plaining about his inability to influence elections in which he had no right to partici-
pate.”47 Stevens succinctly summarized the petitioner’s complaint in McCutcheon:
[The petitioner, Shaun McCutcheon], makes it clear that his ob-
jection to the federal statute was based entirely on its impairment
of his ability to influence the election of political leaders for
whom he had no right to vote. He is an Alabama citizen; in the
2012 election cycle he made equal contributions to 15 different
candidates, only two of whom were from Alabama. The other
thirteen were campaigning in California, Ohio, Indiana, Maryland,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. Of primary sig-
nificance is the fact that his only complaint about the federal
statute was its prohibition against his making contributions in
corporations from obtaining ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace’ by using ‘re-
sources amassed in the economic marketplace.’” Id. at 350 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990)).
43 Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49).
44 Id. at 359.
45 Id. In Citizens United, the Supreme Court quotes Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion
from McConnell v. FEC:
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics.
It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies,
and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who
support those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legi-
timate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a
contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate will
respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors.
Democracy is premised on responsiveness.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003)).
46 See 572 U.S. 185, 193 (2014) (plurality opinion).
47 J. John Paul Stevens (Ret.), Harold Leventhal Lecture at the Administrative Law Section
of the D.C. Bar (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/JPS
%20Speech(DC)_09-12-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JBS-RQVS].
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2014 to candidates in twelve other non-Alabama elections—
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Minnesota, Utah,
Washington, and Wisconsin.48
Having contributed $33,088 USD to sixteen different federal candidates, McCutcheon
had wished to donate money to twelve additional out-of-state candidates, but was
unable to legally do so.49
The McCutcheon plurality crystallized the prevailing position that any campaign
finance regulation must be narrowly tailored to address the compelling government
interest of fighting quid pro quo corruption50 or its appearance.51 Any restriction
pursuing “other objectives . . . impermissibly inject the Government ‘into the debate
over who should govern.’ And those who govern should be the last people to help
decide who should govern.”52 Campaign finance restrictions cannot target “[i]ngra-
tiation and access” enjoyed by a candidate’s supporters or the candidate’s “general
gratitude” to those supporters.53 Even if the line between general influence and quid
pro quo corruption can be blurred or vague at times, the Court asserts that “the distinc-
tion must be respected in order to safeguard basic First Amendment rights. . . . ‘[I]n
drawing that line, the First Amendment requires [the Court] to err on the side of
protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.’”54
The Court exalts out-of-state campaign contributions as an important expression
of the First Amendment.55 First, McCutcheon states “[t]here is no right more basic
48 Id.
49 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 194–95.
50 According to the Court, the Latin phrase, quid pro quo, “captures the notion of a direct
exchange of an official act for money.” Id. at 192. The Court continues, “The hallmark of cor-
ruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.” Id. (quoting FEC v. Nat’l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)).
For instance, a specific act like a bribe would constitute a basic form of quid pro quo
corruption. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2016) (“[T]he federal
bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. . . . makes it a crime for a public official or person selected to
be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly to demand, seek, receive, accept, or agree
to receive or accept anything of value in return for being influenced in the performance of
any official act. An official act is defined as any decision or action on any question, matter,
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law
be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s
place of trust or profit.” (internal quotes omitted)).
51 See McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 192.
52 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,
564 U.S. 721, 750 (2011)); see also Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 736, 740 (“[T]he prevention of
quid pro quo corruption, or its appearance, is the only sufficiently important state interest to
justify limits on campaign contributions.”).
53 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 192.
54 Id. at 209.
55 See id.
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in our democracy” than civil participation in electing the nation’s political leaders,
and individual campaign contributions constitute one way of exercising that right.56
An individual campaign contribution to a candidate running for political office in
another state is an exercise of the individual’s First Amendment “right to participate
in the public debate through political expression and political association.”57 Second,
McCutcheon indicates that “[i]t is no answer to say that the individual can simply
contribute less money to more people.”58 It is safe to say that the Court’s stance
would be the same should the same individual have to contribute less money to the
same number of or less outside candidates.59 Third, the Court states that the obliga-
tion to uphold the First Amendment “is especially great for individuals who do not
have ready access to alternative avenues for supporting their preferred politicians
and policies.”60 Therefore, the campaign contribution rights of out-of-state donors
like the McCutcheon petitioner are afforded protection precisely because they have
few other readily available means to support their policies and candidates.61
II. THE FOUR STATES THAT DARE(D)
In the aftermath of the above-mentioned cases, political engagement across state
lines has been a noteworthy development in campaign finance development. Yet,
in the United States, only four states have tried to create out-of-state contribution
limits: Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, and Vermont.62 With the November 2018 overturn
56 Id. at 191. But see FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 (“[C]ontributions lie closer
to the edges than to the core of political expression.”).
57 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 203. The Court continues, “The contribution ‘serves as a gen-
eral expression of support for the candidate and his views’ and ‘serves to affiliate a person
with a candidate.’” Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1976) (per curiam)).
58 Id. at 204.
59 See id. at 204–05.
60 Id. at 205.
61 See id.
62 Elsewhere, in 1998, the voters of Akron, Ohio, passed a ballot initiative that placed a
limit on out-of-state contributions for local elections. See Frank v. City of Akron, 95 F. Supp.
2d 707, 707 (N.D. Ohio 1999). The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio not
only deemed this provision of the measure “so clearly unconstitutional,” but the defendants
did not even contest the court’s granting partial judgment on the provision’s violation of the
First Amendment. Id. at 708 n.3. The District Court reasoned that “[t]he section limiting the
percentage of a candidate’s funds that could be raised from contributors outside the Akron
city limits . . . would have the effect of absolutely prohibiting certain individuals, who might
work in the City of Akron but reside elsewhere, from contributing to the candidate of their
choice.” Id. The Sixth Circuit eventually reversed this decision in part on other grounds, and
did not address Akron’s out-of-state contribution limits. See Frank v. City of Akron, 290 F.3d
813, 815, 819 (6th Cir. 2002).
While Arizona has not legislated a limit on out-of-state contributions, in 2007, the Ninth
Circuit struck down a pro se complaint alleging that “Arizona’s congressional candidates
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of Alaska’s regulations ceilings on non-resident contribution limits, Hawaii remains
the last state standing.63 All the other aforementioned states’ interests in preventing
the spread of outsized, out-of-state influence in state elections have been struck
down on First Amendment grounds.64 This Part seeks to provide an overview of the
campaign finance developments in each of these four states, as well as an analysis
of the cases that ultimately shaped these states’ laws on non-resident contributions.
A. Vermont
In the mid-2000s, legal challenges arose regarding Vermont’s bipartisan limit
on out-of-state contributions65: “A candidate, political party or political committee
shall not accept, in any two-year general election cycle, more than 25% of total con-
tributions from contributors who are not residents of the state of Vermont or from
political committees or parties not organized in the state of Vermont.”66 In particu-
lar, one of the areas in which opposition to the Vermont law focused on was the
state’s 25% limitations on all out-of-state contributions to its candidates.67
The Second Circuit, in Landell v. Sorrell, found no “sufficiently important gov-
ernmental interest” to support this aforementioned provision in the Vermont law,
raising First Amendment reservations.68 According to the court, the impact of the
out-of-state contribution limit was to isolate one group of people—non-residents.69
The law denied non-residents the same First Amendment rights that Vermont residents
were enjoying, so the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and struck
down the provision as unconstitutional.70
have a legal duty to represent only the interests of their constituents and that by receiving cam-
paign contributions from residents of other states or election districts, the candidates violate
the constitutional rights of . . . Arizona voters.” Solig v. McCain, 224 F. App’x 563, 564 (9th
Cir. 2007).
In 2004, the D.C. District Court explained that a minority party candidate for a U.S.
Senate seat in Alaska was “unable to establish that the disparity in campaign [finance] re-
sources caused by out-of-state contributions constitutes an injury in fact sufficient for standing.”
Sykes v. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2004). The court reasoned that “political free
trade does not necessarily require that all who participate in the political marketplace do so
with exactly equal resources.” Id. (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
257 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)).
63 See infra Section II.D.
64 See infra Sections II.A–C.
65 The 1997 Vermont Finance Reform Act received strong bipartisan support. See Landell
v. Sorrell (Landell I), 118 F. Supp. 2d. 459, 467 (D. Vt. 2000).
66 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805(c) (2012).
67 Landell v. Sorrell (Landell II), 382 F.3d 91, 146 (2d Cir. 2004).
68 Id.
69 See id. at 148–49.
70 Id. In Landell v. Sorrell, the Vermont District Court struck down the state’s out-of-state
contribution limits. The district court observed:
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The Second Circuit observed that Vermont’s law was simultaneously overbroad
and underinclusive as it pertained to its professed interest in preventing corruption.71
The court turned to the Ninth Circuit decision, VanNatta v. Keisling, whereby the court
cited an Oregon statute’s overbreadth, which “stemmed from the fact that it prevented
all non-resident contributions once the 10 percent threshold had been reached, even
those too small to have any corruptive influence.”72 At the same time, the Oregon pro-
vision suffered from underbreadth since it took no tangible steps to prevent large,
corruptive resident contributions from Oregon residents.73 Stated more simply: “the
non-resident cap was not closely drawn to advance the goal of preventing corruption.”74
Similarly, the Second Circuit held the Vermont provision was overbroad be-
cause even though non-resident contributions were no more likely to pose corruption
than contributions by in-state residents, it nevertheless prohibited small, out-of-state
contributions once the 25% threshold—more than double Oregon’s rate—was
reached.75 Consequently, the court concluded that any such law would need an
alternative explanation further distinguishing out-of-state and in-state contribution
limits and more explanation as to what Vermont’s significant interest in eliminating
only non-residents’ small donations is.76
At the time, the Second Circuit afforded the Supreme Court of Alaska some
credit in articulating an explanation for its state’s interest in capping out-of-state
contributions.77 State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union had upheld an Alaska law that
capped non-resident contributions at a lower percentage than the limit in Vermont’s
Firstly, most if not all of the examples of allegedly suspicious out of state
contributions enumerated by Defendants—and especially those targeted
by the press—also happened to be large and often from special interest
groups that are viewed by the public stereotypically as the source of
suspicious campaign money. There was no evidence that the fact that
the money came from out of state is necessarily the root of the problem.
Secondly, the proffered justification does not account for the fact that
many people outside of Vermont have legitimate stakes in Vermont
politics, and therefore have a right to participate in Vermont elections.
Individuals from outside Vermont who are nevertheless influenced by
Vermont law must have some access to the political process here.
Landell I, 118 F. Supp. 2d. 470, 484 (D. Vt. 2000).
71 Landell II, 382 F.3d at 147.
72 Id. (citing VanNatta v. Keisling (VanNatta II), 151 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998)).
73 Id. (citing VanNatta II, 151 F.3d at 1221) (explaining the VanNatta court’s decision
regarding the Oregon statute).
74 Id. (quoting VanNatta II, 151 F.3d at 1221) (internal quotations omitted).
75 See id. According to the court, “Increasing campaign expenditures require candidates
to seek and rely on a smaller number of larger contributors, often outside the state, rather than
a large number of small contributors.” Id. Furthermore, “[t]here are only vague references
to the danger of out-of-state contributions, and all refer to the danger of excessively large (not
cumulatively great) contributions.” Id.
76 See id.
77 Id.
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provision because of the fear that candidates would become too subservient and
dependent to the wishes of large out-of-state contributors.78
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit’s respect for the Supreme Court of Alaska’s
attempt at rationalizing its out-of-state contribution limits stops short of an endorse-
ment.79 In fact, the Landell court reiterated that even if political candidates could
become exposed and attracted to large out-of-state contributions from non-residents,
such problems are not the exclusive domain of nonstate residents.80 The Supreme
Court of Alaska’s distinctions, therefore, were meaningless.81
Therefore, the Second Circuit has explicitly disregarded a state’s governmental
interest to “permit[] state governments to preserve their systems from the influence,
exercised only though speech-related activities, of non-residents.”82 While the U.S.
Supreme Court would eventually grant certiorari and overturn much of Landell, the
Court did not address, nor reverse, the out-of-state contribution limits stricken by
the Second Circuit.83
B. Alaska
Most recently, in November 2018, the Ninth Circuit curbed Alaska’s noncon-
forming streak and overturned the state’s campaign finance laws.84 This limited
candidates running for the state’s office of state representative, state senate, munici-
pal office, lieutenant governor and any other positions other than the governorship
from accepting more than $3,000 USD from out-of-state residents since: (1) the laws
directly violated the First Amendment; (2) they did not advance Alaska’s purported
state interest to reduce or prevent quid pro quo corruption; and (3) the laws per-
ceived unjustifiable influence out of non-resident campaign contributors.85
78 Id. at 147–48 (citing State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 617 (Alaska
1999)).
79 See id.
80 Id.
81 See id. at 148.
82 Id.
83 See generally Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
84 See ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072(a)(3) (2019) (“A candidate or an individual who has filed
with the commission the document necessary to permit that individual to incur election-related
expenses under AS 15.13.100 may not solicit or accept a contribution from . . . a group or-
ganized under the laws of another state, resident in another state, or whose participants are
not residents of this state at the time the contribution is made . . . .”); id. § 15.13.072(e)(3) (“A
candidate or an individual who has filed with the commission the document necessary to permit
that individual to incur election-related expenses under AS 15.13.100 may solicit or accept con-
tributions from an individual who is not a resident of the state at the time the contribution is
made if the amounts contributed by individuals who are not residents do not exceed . . . $3,000
a calendar year, if the candidate or individual is seeking the office of state representative or
municipal or other office.”); id. § 15.13.072(f) (“[Contributions from] individuals who are not
residents may not exceed 10 percent of total contributions made to . . . group[s] or political
part[ies] during the calendar or group year in which the contributions are received.”).
85 Thompson v. Hebdon, 909 F.3d 1027, 1040–43 (9th Cir. 2018).
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The case, Thompson v. Hebdon, unequivocally overturns the Supreme Court of
Alaska’s 1999 holding in Alaska Civil Liberties Union that the “potential for distor-
tion” deriving from out-of-state contributors in Alaskan elections is a “sufficiently
compelling state interest” to uphold non-resident contribution restrictions.86 Alaska
Civil Liberties Union may have tried to distinguish itself from the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in VanNatta when it did not cite quid pro quo corruption or its appearance
as a compelling state interest to uphold Alaska’s non-resident contribution restric-
tions.87 The Supreme Court of Alaska, however, did find that fighting “purchased
or coerced influence which is grossly disproportionate”—in other words, corrup-
tion—is a compelling state interest.88
Thompson v. Dauphinais wrestles with the Alaska District Court’s holding89 that
out-of-state aggregate limits served an anti-corruption purpose because of the state’s
unusual vulnerability to “exploitation by outside industry and interests,” who “can
and do exert pressure on their employees to make contributions to state and munici-
pal candidates” in Alaska.90 Citing Citizens United and McCutcheon, the court held
86 State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 617 (Alaska 1999). The Supreme
Court of Alaska distinguished its ruling from that of VanNatta, reasoning that Alaska’s restric-
tions on contributions only applied to non-residents—not other Alaska residents regardless
of what district they resided in. Id. at 616 (citing VanNatta II, 151 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir.
1998)). Furthermore, Alaska—unlike Oregon—is not contiguous to another state. Id.
87 Id. at 615.
88 Id. at 617.
89 See Thompson v. Dauphinais, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1023, 1037 (D. Alaska 2016). The Alaska
District Court had disagreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that the defendants “presented no
evidence of a nexus between residency and quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, and that
Alaska’s non-resident aggregate contribution limit is unconstitutional under McCutcheon and
VanNatta.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the District Court disregarded the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Whitmore in deliberating on the constitutionality of non-resident contribu-
tion limits because it considered Whitmore to not have been “on point.” Id. at 1037–38 n.53.
90 Thompson, 909 F.3d at 1040–41 (quoting Dauphinais, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1039) (in-
ternal quotations omitted). The Alaska District Court had reasoned that the out-of-state campaign
contribution limit accomplishes the following:
[It] furthers Alaska’s sufficiently important interest in preventing quid
pro quo corruption or its appearance in two ways. First, . . . [it] furthers
the State’s anticorruption interest directly by avoiding large amounts
of out-of-state money from being contributed to a single candidate, thus
reducing the appearance that the candidate feels obligated to outside
interests over those of his constituents. Second, the nonresident aggregate
limit discourages circumvention of the $500 base limit and other game-
playing by outside interests, particularly given [the Alaska Public Offices
Commission’s] limited ability and jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute out-of-state violations of Alaska’s campaign finance laws.
Dauphinais, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1039.
Note that the anti-corruption argument made in Dauphinais marked a remarkable departure
from the approach used by the state in arguing Alaska Civil Liberties Union seventeen years
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that restraining the “undue influence” of non-resident contributors—an objective of
the District Court—was no longer a valid state interest.91 While the lower court’s
ruling sided with Alaska’s argument that the out-of-state contribution limit “reduces
the appearance that a candidate will be obligated to outside interests rather than
constituents,” in practice, the limit “says nothing about corruption.”92 The court
ruled out Alaska’s demonstration that exploitation of the state’s natural resources
by out-of-state firms posed an anti-corruption interest.93
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that Alaskan law’s out-of-state aggregate
limit is not a fitting solution to the problem of anti-corruption interests, putting the court
at odds with dissimilar conclusions in Alaska Civil Liberties Union,94 Dauphinais,95
and Chief Judge Sidney Thomas’s dissent.96 The state’s law, Thompson holds, is what
the Supreme Court in McCutcheon97 would have deemed a poor fit in addressing
earlier: “The State refers us to no specific evidence of corruption or the appearance of corruption
caused by out-of-state contributions, and does not contend that quid pro quo corruption jus-
tifies these restraints.” Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 615.
91 Thompson, 909 F.3d at 1034 (first citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359–60
(2010); then citing McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 206–07 (2014)).
92 Id. at 1041 (emphasis omitted).
93 Id.
94 See Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 615 (“Former Governor Walter Hickel
stated that ‘whenever a candidate has to seek donations from outside the state, the candidate
is buying a potential conflict of interest.’ Former Governor Jay Hammond has stated that
‘[t]he necessity of having to raise substantial sums of money from non-Alaska resident con-
tributors discourages many qualified Alaskans from becoming candidates. And it taints those
who do.’” (alteration in original)).
95 See Dauphinais, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1029 (“[J]ust ten votes can stop a legislative action
such as an oil or gas tax increase from becoming law. Consequently, the incentive to buy a
vote, and the chances of successfully doing so, are therefore higher in Alaska than in states
with larger legislative bodies. A second factor is Alaska’s almost complete reliance on one
industry for a majority of its revenues.”).
96 See Thompson, 909 F.3d at 1045 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting in part) (“[W]hile 85 to
92% of Alaska’s budget derives from the oil and gas industry, that industry is not responsible
for more than 50% of any other state’s budget. . . . Today, not only does the State depend on
the industry to fund its services, but . . . ‘the petroleum industry supports one-third of all
Alaska jobs.’. . . The interests of out-of-state oil companies are often at odds with the in-
terests of some Alaska residents. . . . [Approximately] 17 percent of all Alaskans—or 120,000
people—live in rural areas, where 95 percent of households use fish and 86 percent use game
for subsistence purposes. . . . Resource extraction has the potential to cause irremediable
damage to Alaskan lands and culture . . . .”).
97 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 210 (2014) (“The difficulty is that once the
aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contributions of any amount. But Congress’s selection
of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that contributions of that amount or less do not create
a cognizable risk of corruption. If there is no corruption concern in giving nine candidates
up to $5,200 each, it is difficult to understand how a tenth candidate can be regarded as cor-
ruptible if given $1,801, and all others corruptible if given a dime. And if there is no risk that
additional candidates will be corrupted by donations of up to $5,200, then the Government
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corruption or its appearance because the state is unable to explain how earlier con-
tributions by a non-resident are less corrupting than the amounts given to other candi-
dates after that aggregate limit has been surpassed.98 Specifically, the Thompson court
is puzzled as to how “a contribution made after the candidate has already amassed
$3,000 [USD] in out-of-state funds—is corrupting” or how “an out-of-state contribu-
tion of $500 [USD] is inherently more corrupting than a like in-state contribution.”99
Thompson also attempts to clarify what appropriately constitutes “self-gover-
nance.”100 First, the court contends that “self-governance” is a legitimate state interest
in the context of limiting “who may exercise official, legislative powers”—an interest
in controlling who governs.101 By contrast, while the majority opinion in Thompson
asserts that its definition of “self-governance” concerns limiting who governs, the
state and the court’s dissenting opinion perceive “self-governance” as limiting contri-
butions to those who would govern.102 Moreover, the majority opinion also opines
that the dissent’s contention that states should be allowed to restrict who may
“directly influence the outcome of an election” through contributions is a moot point
since it has been settled by the Supreme Court in McCutcheon and Citizens United.103
Second, assuming that Alaska has defined more appropriately a state interest in
“self-governance,” the Supreme Court’s ruling in McCutcheon only articulates one
narrowly defined, legitimate state interest in limiting contributions to campaigns:
“preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.”104 The majority opinion
disregards the dissent’s suggestion that “self-governance” could be accepted as a
new important state interest and instead subscribes to a narrow adherence to the
Supreme Court precedent.105
must defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that they prevent circumvention of the
base limits.”).
98 Thompson, 909 F.3d at 1041.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1042.
101 Id. (quoting Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 782 F.3d 520,
531 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc)).
102 Id.
103 Id.; see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 208 (2014) (“Spending large sums of
money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise
of an officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo corruption. Nor
does the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner influence over or
access to elected officials or political parties.” (internal quotations omitted)).
104 Thompson, 909 F.3d at1043 (quoting McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 206–07). Otherwise,
“[c]ampaign finance restrictions that pursue other objectives . . . impermissibly inject the
Government ‘into the debate over who should govern.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 750 (2011)).
105 Id. (“Our decisions must comport with the reasoning or theory, not just the holding, of
Supreme Court decisions [even if it is contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent].” (internal quo-
tations omitted)). But see id. at 1046 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting in part) (“[T]he proof at trial
was more than theoretical. . . . Particularly in the aftermath of the VECO scandal, the
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Finally, acknowledging that the Supreme Court has not conclusively restricted
the possibility of other, new alternative state interests arising in the future, Thompson
rejects the notion that self-governance is an important state interest to begin with.106
It does, however, pay some lip service to the “self-governance” argument, perplex-
ingly concluding that “[s]tates have an important interest in preserving the integrity
of their political institutions,” and a “vital method of doing so is by curbing large mone-
tary contributions, which can corrode the public’s faith in its government’s respon-
siveness to the popular will.”107
C. Oregon
In 1994, Oregon voters were the first to install residency-based restrictions
campaign contributions through a ballot initiative.108 The measure barred candidates
from collecting more than 10% of their campaign contributions from out-of-state
and out-of-district donors.109 The measure, “entitled the Freedom From Special
Interests initiative,” sought to “prevent out-of-district individuals and organizations
from buying influence in elections, thus allowing ordinary people [to] secure their right-
ful control of their own government.”110 Therefore, whereas Alaska and Vermont’s
restrictions on contributions pertained to out-of-state donors, Oregon’s law additionally
nonresident aggregate contribution furthers Alaska’s interest in preventing the appearance
of corruption, thereby increasing ‘[c]onfidence in the integrity of [Alaska’s] electoral proces-
ses,’ a value ‘essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.’” (quoting Purcell v.
Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (per curiam))).
106 Id. at 1043.
107 Id. at 1044.
108 See Wallace, supra note 27, at 607. The ballot initiative, entitled “Measure 6,” consisted
of four sections:
(1) Section 1 allows candidates to “use or direct only contributions which
originate from individuals who at the time of their donation were residents
of the electoral district of the public office sought by the candidate * * *;”
(2) where more than ten percent of a candidate’s total campaign funding
is in violation of Section 1, Section 2 punishes the candidate by either
(a) forcing the elected official to forfeit the office and to not hold a
subsequent elected public office for a period equal to twice the tenure
of the office sought, or (b) forbidding the unelected candidate from
holding an elected public office for a period equal to twice the tenure
of the office sought;
(3) Section 3 prohibits “qualified donors” (i.e., in-district residents) from
contributing funds to a candidate on behalf of an out-of-district resident;
(4) Section 4 labels a violation of Section 3 as an “unclassified felony.”
VanNatta v. Keisling (VanNatta I), 899 F. Supp. 488, 491 (D. Or. 1995) (alteration in original).
The measure limited the amount of contributions that Oregon candidates could accept from
out-of-state and out-of-district donors. Id.
109 Wallace, supra note 27, at 607; see also OR. CONST. art. II, § 22.
110 VanNatta I, 899 F. Supp. at 491 (internal quotations omitted).
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applied to out-of-district residents living within the state.111 In addition, while the mea-
sure passed by Oregon’s voters did not explicitly limit its application to state elections,
Oregon’s Constitution limited it to only state elections.112
In VanNatta, the appellants argued that under the Oregon law, state election
candidates could receive unlimited contributions from out-of-district donors as long
as they did not “use or direct” them.113 They relied on Buckley, in which the Supreme
Court upheld contribution limits, to explain that “the free speech value of contributing
lay in the symbolic expression of support,” rather than the total contribution amount.114
The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the appellants’ argument, explaining that in
actuality, “campaigns will have no incentive to accept money which they cannot legally
spend,” implicating contributors’ First Amendment rights to see their donations
being used by candidates.115
The district court had employed strict scrutiny in determining that the Oregon
law was “not narrowly tailored to prevent corruption because it prevented non-
corrupt out-of-district contributions, failed to thwart in-district corruption, and failed
to prevent large out-of-district contributions so long as they do not exceed 10% of the
total.”116 The Ninth Circuit, however, applies a “less-than-strict, rigorous scrutiny.”117
As previously discussed, VanNatta held that the Oregon law restricting out-of-
state and out-of-district campaign contributions violates the First Amendment
because it is not closely drawn to prevent corruption.118 Interestingly, up to this point,
the court is unanimous.119 Judge Melvin Brunetti dissents, however, regarding the
appellant’s portrayal of the state’s interest as being about the prevention of corrup-
tion.120 He asserts that the appellant’s state interest was “a sufficiently important
interest in protecting [Oregon’s] republican form of government.”121 The dissent
acknowledges that while none of the cases it cites “are directly on point,” when
analyzed together, they establish a strong state interest in maintaining “the integrity
111 Wallace, supra note 27, at 607.
112 VanNatta II, 151 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Although Measure 6 does not
expressly limit its application to state races, it amends Article II of the state constitution which
governs state elections. The parties do not argue Measure 6 applies to federal elections and to the
extent it attempted to do so, it would be preempted by the Federal Election Campaign Act.”).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1219–20 (emphasis added) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per
curiam)).
115 Id. at 1220.
116 Id. at 1219.
117 Id. at 1220; see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259–60 (1986)
(“We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less compelling justifica-
tion that restrictions on independent spending.”).
118 See discussion supra Section II.A.
119 VanNatta II, 151 F.3d at 1222.
120 Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
121 Id.
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of electoral district lines.”122 For example, the court in VanNatta cites to Holt Civic
Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, and notes that, in that case, the Supreme Court empha-
sized cities and states’ right “to reserve their political processes and resources for
their own residents.”123 By contrast, the VanNatta majority rejected this idea that
non-resident contribution restrictions are justifiable because they prevent “a distor-
tion of the republican form of government.”124 Later, the Supreme Court did not
grant certiorari in VanNatta, essentially upholding the majority’s decision.125
D. Hawaii
Soon after the Second Circuit’s ruling in Landell, Hawaii enacted what is now
the last surviving foray into out-of-state contribution limits.126 The original statute
has since been repealed, as the 2010 amendments to Hawaii’s campaign finance
laws increased the permissible amount of total contributions state candidates could
collect from non-residents from 20% to 30% of total contributions.127 While Hawaii
raised the threshold for non-resident contribution limits, its law is not a dramatic
departure from the overturned laws of Vermont, Alaska, and Oregon because like
the other states, its restrictions create ceilings on out-of-state contributions instead
of more overtly and directly regulating non-resident contributors.128 Therefore, the
prospect that the Supreme Court could grant certiorari in Thompson could have
immense ramifications on whether Hawaii’s law will survive to be a model for other
states’ campaign finance laws or fail to muster First Amendment challenges.129
III. A QUEST TO PRESERVE REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
This Part explores the various arguments to protect republicanism—an issue that
has yet to garner explicit support by the Supreme Court as an important state interest
in the context of campaign finance contributions. It proceeds to explore the confu-
sion of defining an elected official’s “constituent”—a challenge that complicates any
recognition of an interest to preserve separate, state-specific political communities
in the campaign finance law context. Finally, this Part explores the surrogate represen-
tation that a non-resident donor may seek and how it impacts politics outside the
constituent’s home state.
122 Id. at 1223.
123 Id. at 1222; see Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 81 (1978) (holding
that “[a] government unit may legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political processes
to those who reside within its borders”).
124 VanNatta II, 151 F.3d at 1216.
125 See Miller v. VanNatta, 525 U.S. 1104, 1104 (1999).
126 See H.R. 1747, 23d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2005), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/ses
sion2005/bills/HB1747_cd1_.htm [https://perma.cc/NVE6-ZR4V].
127 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-204.5 (2010) (repealed 2010).
128 See H.B. 2003, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2010).
129 See Thompson v. Hebdon, 909 F.3d 1027, 1027 (9th Cir. 2018).
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A. State Interest to Protect Republicanism?
In both Thompson and VanNatta, the dissenting judges pose republicanism as an
important state interest justifying the restriction of out-of-state campaign contribu-
tions.130 The majority opinion in Thompson has unequivocally rejected this stance, stat-
ing that “[s]ince Citizens United and McCutcheon, preventing ‘undue influence’ is no
longer a legitimate basis for restricting contributions under the First Amendment.”131
Nevertheless, it is arguable that limiting the government’s only important interest to
quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of corruption could be considered dicta, es-
pecially in a post–Roberts Court era.132 Citizens United and McCutcheon—both cases
decided by the Roberts Court—do not involve precisely the same kind of non-resident
limits or arguments pertaining to the undermining of states’ political representation
that could be at issue should the Supreme Court grant certiorari to Thompson.133
A state interest to protect republicanism may coincide with an important interest
to tackle corruption.134 In her dissenting opinion to the Supreme Court’s 5–4 decision
in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, Justice Elena Kagan
contends that “the First Amendment’s core purpose is to foster a healthy, vibrant poli-
tical system full of robust discussion and debate.”135 Justice Kagan states in defense
of the First Amendment, over the past century, campaign finance regulations and
public financing programs have been passed to prevent elected officials from acting
for the benefit of wealthy donors, rather than on behalf of all their constituents:
Campaign finance reform over the last century has focused on
one key question: how to prevent massive pools of private money
from corrupting our political system. If an officeholder owes his
election to wealthy contributors, he may act for their benefit
alone, rather than on behalf of all the people. As we recognized
in Buckley . . . , our seminal campaign finance case, large private
contributions may result in “political quid pro quo[s],” which
undermine the integrity of our democracy. And even if these
contributions are not converted into corrupt bargains, they still
may weaken confidence in our political system because the public
perceives “the opportunities for abuse[s].” To prevent both cor-
ruption and the appearance of corruption—and so to protect our
130 See discussion supra Sections II.B–C.
131 Thompson, 909 F.3d at 1044.
132 See id. at 1034.
133 See id. at 1044.
134 See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 756 (2011)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
135 Id.
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democratic system of governance—citizens have implemented
reforms designed to curb the power of special interests.136
Justice Kagan recounts this history in the context of addressing the constitutionality
of an Arizona campaign finance initiative voted for by Arizona’s citizens.137 Arizona’s
campaign contribution limits had been passed directly as a result of “AzScam”—a
scandal in which almost 10% of Arizona’s legislators were “caught accepting
campaign contributions or bribes in exchange for supporting a piece of legisla-
tion.”138 Therefore, Justice Kagan linked her interpretation of the First Amendment
to an understanding that elected public servants should be accountable, first and
foremost, to all their constituents—not a small minority of wealthy contributors.139
In her article, The Narrowing Government Interest in Campaign Finance Regu-
lations: Republic Lost?, Deborah Roy argues that preserving a representative democ-
racy should be a government interest recognized by the Supreme Court when campaign
finance regulations are analyzed.140 She argues that by taking “a nearly absolutist view
of the First Amendment protection of money as political speech,” the Roberts Court has
fundamentally failed to consider the need to preserve a representative democracy.141
Roy contends that a jurisprudence that utilizes the First Amendment to undermine rep-
resentative democracy betrays the spirit of the Constitution.142 Therefore, she argues,
the Supreme Court should take a more balanced approach to weighing the interest of
preserving representative democracy against a First Amendment right to campaign
contributions.143 This balance could be an aspiration raised in McCutcheon that has not
been fully realized: “Such responsiveness [of representatives to their constituents’
concerns] is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected officials.”144
In McCutcheon, Professor Lawrence Lessig of Harvard Law School filed an amicus
brief in support of the appellee, analyzing the Founding Fathers’ conception of cor-
ruption.145 In his brief, he argues that the residency requirement of Congress “was
a response to the fear that wealthy non-residents would purchase elected office.”146
His rationale is best articulated by the Constitutional Convention delegate, George
136 Id. (internal citations omitted).
137 Id. at 760.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 784.
140 See Deborah A. Roy, The Narrowing Government Interest in Campaign Finance
Regulations: Republic Lost?, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2015). Roy is a trial attorney in the
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice. Id. at 2.
141 Id. at 2–3.
142 Id. at 3.
143 Id.
144 McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 227 (2014).
145 Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Lawrence Lessig et al. in Support of Appellee at 2,
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (No. 12-536).
146 Id. at 14.
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Mason, who explained, “If residence be not required, Rich men of neighbouring
States, may employ with success the means of corruption in some particular district
and thereby get into the public Councils after having failed in their own State.”147
Such measures as this were implemented by the Constitution’s Framers as “broad
prophylactic measures . . . sufficiently important to include in our Nation’s charter”
despite lacking “any direct evidence of corruption.”148 Thus, unlike the McCutcheon
plurality, Lessig indicates that generally, residency is a critical consideration in a
representative democracy.149
In addition, the late Justice Stevens not only suggested that residency is a critical
consideration in a representative democracy,150 but argued that rules restricting con-
tributions and expenditures “should recognize the distinction between money provided
by their constituents and money provided by non-voters, such as corporations and
people living in other jurisdictions.”151 Testifying before the Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration in 2014, Justice Stevens asserted that the jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court “has been incorrectly predicated on the assumption of [quid
pro quo] corruption or the appearance of corruption” is the government’s only jus-
tified interest for regulating campaign finance laws.152 He pointed to Bluman v.
FEC—a 2011 D.C. Circuit opinion penned by now-Justice Brett Kavanaugh—to
show that the interest in protecting speech about general issues is more important
than protecting the campaign speech by non-voters.153
While Bluman held “that the United States has a compelling interest for pur-
poses of First Amendment analysis in limiting the participation of foreign citizens
in activities of American democratic self-government,”154 this case may not be enough
147 Id. (quoting 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 218 (Farrand ed., 1911)).
148 Id. at 15.
149 See Roy, supra note 140, at 41.
150 See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (“[The Constitution’s] great
innovation . . . was that ‘our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one
federal, each protected from incursion by the other’—‘a legal system unprecedented in form
and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its
own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are
governed by it.’ The Constitution thus contemplates that a State’s government will represent
and remain accountable to its own citizens.” (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
151 See Dollars and Sense: How Undisclosed Money and Post-McCutcheon Campaign
Finance Will Affect 2014 and Beyond: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of J. John Paul Stevens (Ret.)) [hereinafter
Dollars and Sense].
152 Id. In addition, Justice Stevens argued that “while money is used to finance speech, money
is not speech. . . . [F]inancial activities should not receive the same constitutional protection as
speech itself. After all, campaign funds were used to finance the Watergate burglaries—
actions that clearly were not protected by the First Amendment.” Id.
153 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011); Dollars and Sense, supra note 151.
154 Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288 (emphasis added).
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to muster a sufficient constitutional challenge to the constitutionality of out-of-state
contribution limits.155 Bluman’s rationale for barring foreign contributions is that it
is “fundamental to the definition of our national political community” that non-U.S.
citizens are prevented from having outside influence over the American political
process; foreign citizens lack the constitutional right to participate in democratic self-
government in the United States.156 Bluman, however, does not equate the relationship
of American citizens to different U.S. states and the relationship of non-U.S. foreign
nationals to the United States.157 Rather, Kavanaugh explicitly writes, “The compel-
ling interest that justifies Congress in restraining foreign nationals’ participation in
American elections—namely, preventing foreign influence over the U.S. govern-
ment—does not apply equally to . . . citizens of other states and municipalities.”158
This rejection to extend the parallel between foreign nationals and out-of-state citizens
stems in part from the fact that “citizens of other states and municipalities are all
members of the American political community,”159 whereas “[a]liens are by definition
those outside of this community” altogether.160 Therefore, Bluman stops short of
distinguishing between an American political community and various, state-specific
political communities.161
While Bluman explores the American political community vis-à-vis foreign
nationals, the Holt Civic Club case explores the concept of local political communi-
ties, albeit within the context of the right to vote in local elections.162 In Holt Civil
Club, the Supreme Court held that it has never
extended the “one man, one vote” principle to individuals resid-
ing beyond the geographic confines of the governmental entity
concerned, be it the State or its political subdivisions. On the
contrary, our cases have uniformly recognized that a government
unit may legitimately restrict the right to participate in its politi-
cal processes to those who reside within its borders.163
155 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1141–42
(2014) (“[P]artisan federalism is more consistent with cross-border participation than with
its prohibition.”); Todd E. Pettys, Campaign Finance, Federalism, and the Case of the Long-
Armed Donor, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 77, 89 (2014) (“There are strong reasons to doubt
that the Court would find that restrictions on out-of-state campaign spending can be justified
by sufficiently powerfully governmental interests.”).
156 Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
157 See id. (making no comparison between the two groups).
158 Id. at 290.
159 Id.
160 Id. (quoting Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1982)).
161 Id. at 290–91.
162 See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978).
163 Id.
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Therefore, this case broadly promotes a general idea of democratic self-govern-
ment, in which publicly elected representatives on the state or local level are to be
controlled only by their residents.164
Finally, in his amicus brief in support of the appellees in Thompson, Professor
David Fontana of George Washington University Law School furthers the push for
republicanism by describing what would constitute a state-specific political commu-
nity.165 First, Fontana asserts that state governments are intended to be “‘more sensitive
to the diverse needs’ of their populations.”166 In order to accomplish this, state gov-
ernments have to reflect their distinctive political communities’ preferences and
opinions.167 Second, Fontana argues that state governments can constitute “‘laboratories
for devising solutions to difficult legal problems,’”168 effectively producing “differ-
ent policy outcomes because of different political inputs.”169 Third, what James
Madison deemed in The Federalist No. 51 as the “distinct and separate departments”
comprised by the states constitutes the checks on governmental power in the U.S.
system of federalism.170 Finally, states compose their own unique political communi-
ties because they are self-governing and, therefore, restrict key activities of self-
government, such as voting, to constituents within their political communities.171
B. What Is a Constituent?
One of the difficulties in recognizing an interest to preserve separate, state-
specific political communities within the context of campaign finance law is the
164 See Richard Briffault, Of Constituents and Contributors, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 29,
52 (2015); see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 631 (1969) (holding
New York statute restricting the right to vote in school district elections to only those “sub-
jectively concerned” violates the Equal Protection Clause because everyone in the community
is benefitted by better public education).
165 Brief of Free Speech for People & Professor David Fontana as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellees & in Support of Affirmance of the Judgment Below, Thompson v. Hebdon, 909 F.3d
1027 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-35019) [hereinafter Fontana Brief]. In his amicus brief, Fontana
states that the Supreme Court has recognized, for a long time “that the state’s interest in demo-
cratic self-government includes definition of the scope of the political community.” Id. at 8; see
also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642–43 (1973) (“We recognize a State’s interest in es-
tablishing its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that government to those
who are within the basic conception of a political community. We recognize, too, the State’s
broad power to define its political community.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
166 Fontana Brief, supra note 165, at 7 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991)).
167 Id.
168 Id. (quoting Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009)); see also New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a labora-
tory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
169 Fontana Brief, supra note 165, at 8.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 10–11.
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confusion as to who constitutes an elected official’s constituents. For instance,
neither the United States Constitution, nor the Supreme Court have defined who
exactly is a constituent of a United States senator.172
The meaning of “constituent” found relevance recently in the federal corruption
case against New Jersey Senator Robert Menendez.173 Menendez had been charged
with using his senatorial powers to do favors for a wealthy, Dominican-American
donor living in Florida in exchange for political contributions, gifts, and vacations.174
The question was whether members of Congress exclusively serve the citizens of
their home state, or whether they represent broader national interests.175 For exam-
ple, the defendant’s brief, submitted by Menendez’s attorney, raises Menendez’s
“attention to cultural minorities and under-represented communities, particularly
Hispanic-Americans, as well as immigration issues generally” as exemplifying “his
focus on ethnic constituencies and issue constituencies whose members are not
limited to New Jersey residents.”176 In other words, Menendez and other elected
public servants in Congress are tasked with legislating policy that considers the
welfare of both their state’s residents and of Americans living across the nation.177
In fact, Menendez’s defense referenced Buckley in asserting that “[t]he Constitution
does not distinguish between electoral constituents and non-constituents when guar-
anteeing private citizens . . . the [First Amendment] freedom to express their support
of candidates and causes through political contributions.”178 Ultimately, since “con-
stituency” lacks a fixed legal definition, Menendez argues that it would be improper
to construct a single definition and to instruct the jury about its meaning; rather, “the
word’s meaning and significance is a factual question for the jury” since this word
could implicate Menendez’s state of mind.179
172 Nick Corasaniti, At Menendez Trial, Legal Wrestling over Definition of ‘Constituent,’
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/20/nyregion/senator-robert
-menendez-definition-of-constituent.html [https://nyti.ms/2jMbydd].
173 Id. See generally United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606 (D.N.J. 2018).
174 See Corasaniti, supra note 172.
175 Id.
176 Defendants’ Trial Brief Regarding the Meaning and Significance of the Term “Constitu-
ent,” Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606 (No. 2:15-cr-00155) [hereinafter Menendez Trial Brief];
see also Briffault, supra note 164, at 44 (arguing that while constituencies are often defined
geographically, “electoral constituents are not the only people who . . . may be represented
by an officeholder”). An elected public official may represent the interests of distinct indi-
viduals or groups, such as ethnic communities. Id. at 45. Party and ideology may also be a
grounds for non-constituent representation. Id.
177 See Menendez Trial Brief, supra note 176, at 7–8.
178 Id. at 4; see also Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 492 F.2d 413, 429 (3d Cir. 1974) (“Although fre-
quently when the franking privilege is discussed, reference is made to mailings to constituents,
mailings to nonconstituents are nonetheless a necessary part of a congressman’s legislative
business too.” (emphasis added)).
179 Menendez Trial Brief, supra note 176, at 1. Menendez’s defense attorney compares
instructing a jury about the meaning of “constituent” to proving it with a single meaning of an
endlessly defined word like “friendship.” Id.
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By contrast, a more traditional definition of “constituent” narrowly describes
“one of a group of citizens who elect a representative to a legislature or other public
body.”180 A constituent functions as a voter to authorize an elected official to act on
his or her behalf.181 In addition, a constituency, which is typically defined geographi-
cally, “determine[s] to whom the representative is to be accountable.”182
Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen of Columbia Law School has persuasively argued
that an individual who engages in cross-border political activity and channels money
towards other states “[embraces] the kind of surrogate representation” that impacts
politics outside the constituent’s home state.183 Such an individual may not benefit
directly from out-of-state political engagement, yet he or she tries “to create momentum
for a particular policy or political party, to build a real-life example to inform national
debate, or simply to take comfort in knowing that their preferences are actually
policy—and their partisan group is in control—somewhere.”184 Bulman-Pozen con-
tends that such an individual’s out-of-state political engagement reveals that “states
regularly act not as separate polities[,] but [rather] as platforms for national political
struggle.”185 Consequently, this cross-state political engagement “demonstrates states’
importance as sites of governance and identification, not their lack thereof.”186
Therefore, while an individual operating under this framework may not conform to
a traditional notion of a geographically based constituent, the centrality of the state
as a political entity does not become diminished; it merely takes a new form.187
IV. A REIMAGINING OF STATES’ POWER
In lieu of the Ninth Circuit’s recent ruling in Thompson, it is unclear whether
the Supreme Court will step in and conclusively decide, once and for all, whether
out-of-state contribution restrictions are constitutional.188 While a state interest to
preserve republicanism may eventually emerge, it is undeniable—for the time
180 See Briffault, supra note 164, at 44; see also James Thomas Tucker, Redefining American
Democracy: Do Alternative Voting Systems Capture the True Meaning of “Representation?,”
7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 357, 387 (“The basic premise for ‘relational representation’ rests on con-
sent defined by service to constituents: voters agree to elect a representative, in exchange for
a reciprocal agreement by that representative to address their individual and collective needs.
Historically, this form of representation was tied closely to geography because an agent of
the people was believed to represent the interests of individual voters at the same time that
agent was responding to the demands of the community.”).
181 See Briffault, supra note 164, at 44.
182 Id.
183 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 155, at 1136–37.
184 Id. at 1136.
185 Id. at 1133.
186 Id. at 1142.
187 Id.
188 See Thompson v. Hebdon, 909 F.3d 1027, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2018).
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being—that the campaign finance jurisprudence of the Court is predicated on the
assumption of quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of corruption.189 Therefore,
acknowledging the proliferation of out-of-state contributions, this Article adopts
Bulman-Pozen’s observation that while states may be acting less as “separate polities,”
they are increasingly becoming “platforms for national political struggle.”190 In doing
so, this Article posits that while small or swing states may disproportionately impact
the national political landscape, the prospect of increased, concerted out-of-state
fundraising could allow individual citizens of larger, inelastic states to heavily impact
those races and guide the disproportionate influence of citizens in those smaller
states. While those target states may be vulnerable to non-resident individuals’ con-
tributions and influence, they can remain crucially relevant as platforms for national
political struggle.
A. The Rivalry Between Larger, Partisan States and Smaller, Swing States
In the United States, small states are said to enjoy outsized influence in bodies
like the Senate and House of Representatives, as well as in the Electoral College.191
For instance, Wyoming’s three electors in the Electoral College represent 187,923
residents each, whereas California’s 55 electors represent an average of 677,355
residents each.192 More simply stated, each vote for the presidential race cast in
Wyoming is worth 3.6 times as much as such a vote in California.193 If one com-
pared the average voting power of residents living in the ten most populous states
to the power of the votes of residents living in the ten least populous states, the ratio
is 1 to 2.5.194 Moreover, smaller states’ power is growing—a phenomenon that
189 See id.
190 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 155, at 1133; see also supra Section III.B.
191 See generally Adam Liptak, Smaller States Find Outsize Clout Growing in Senate,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2013), http://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013
/03/11/us/politics/democracy-tested.html?_r%25E2%2580%25B0=%25E2%2580%25B00
[https://perma.cc/5KMT-ME94]; see also Editorial, America Needs a Bigger House, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/09/opinion/expanded
-house-representatives-size.html [https://nyti.ms/32uZ2BV] (showing (1) “representatives
of larger districts are more likely to take political positions at odds with what a majority of
their constituents want”; (2) “the cap on the number of House members leads to districts with
wildly varying populations. . . . violat[ing] the basic constitutional principle of one-person-
one-vote”; and (3) “[s]tates that are already underrepresented in Congress have a weaker voice
in choosing the president”); Paul Krugman, Real America Versus Senate America, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/opinion/midterms-senate-rural
-urban.html [https://nyti.ms/2Dc6rLt].
192 See William Petrocelli, Voters in Wyoming Have 3.6 Times the Voting Power that I
Have. It’s Time to End the Electoral College., HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www
.huffingtonpost.com/william-petrocelli/its-time-to-end-the-electoral-college_b_12891764
.html [https://perma.cc/CBH5-XP2H].
193 Id.
194 See Katy Collin, The Electoral College Badly Distorts the Vote. And It’s Going to Get
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political scientists consider a notable exception to the “one person, one vote” prin-
ciple of democracy.195
Smaller states are becoming more powerful in elections largely due to shifting
demographics.196 Between 2000 and 2010, the U.S. urban population increased 12%,
and cities are growing in the biggest states, where each individual vote is arguably
least influential.197 Furthermore, while larger states like New York, California, North
Carolina, and Illinois are becoming more urban, they are also becoming more liberal.198
Smaller states, however, are becoming more conservative while remaining rural.199
Swing states may be even more disproportionately important in government
races.200 Consider, for example, that New Hampshire—a swing state—hosted almost
one thousand presidential-campaign events in 2008, 2012, and 2016.201 By contrast,
thirteen states and Washington, D.C., which have three or four electoral votes, hosted
only fifty-two total presidential-campaign events combined.202 While the other states
are solidly Democratic or Republican, New Hampshire stands out in that group as
the only swing state.203
B. An Opportunity to Restructure the Influence of Political Power
Given smaller states’ and swing states’ increasingly disproportionate electoral
power and influence on the national, federal government stage, the federal courts’
rulings barring restrictions on out-of-state contributions provide a loophole allowing
Worse., WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/mon
key-cage/wp/2016/11/17/the-electoral-college-badly-distorts-the-vote-and-its-going-to-get
-worse/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a65de5c4578e [https://perma.cc/9G88-Y5X5].
For further perspective, consider analysis by the Yale political scientist, Robert A. Dahl,
who has calculated the difference between local government units with the most voting power
and those that have the least voting power. See Liptak, supra note 191. Dahl’s findings show
that the country with the smallest ratio is Austria (1.5 to 1), while the ratio is never higher
than 21 to 1 in Western democracies like Australia, Belgium, Germany, and Spain. Id. By con-
trast, the ratio between Wyoming and California’s representation is 66 to 1, trailing only
Argentina, Brazil, and Russia in terms of having the least democratic chambers. Id. In addition,
analyses by Professor David Samuels of the University of Minnesota and Professor Richard
Snyder of Brown University similarly indicate that “geographically large countries with federal
systems tend to overrepresent sparsely populated areas.” Id.
195 See Liptak, supra note 191.
196 See Collin, supra note 194.
197 Id.
198 See Liptak, supra note 191.
199 Id.
200 See Parker Richards, The Electoral College Conundrum, ATLANTIC (Nov. 23, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/11/electoral-college-gives-trump-and-gop
-boost/576448/ [https://perma.cc/GS8W-8YLN].
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
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non-resident voters from larger and more partisan states to reshape the balance of
political power.204 This very vulnerability of states to out-of-state individual donors
is what has precisely stoked fear in less heavily populated states like Alaska, Hawaii,
Oregon, and Vermont,205 which are respectively ranked 49th, 48th, 40th, and 27th
in population among the fifty U.S. states.206
If individual voters are organized—outside the framework of political parties,
political action committees, corporations, and labor unions—to make a concerted,
tailored effort to contribute the maximum individual campaign funds to out-of-state
races, those targeted states will have transformed into platforms for national political
struggle.207 The most efficient way to enact this impact would be for out-of-state
contributors to prioritize and divert their individual contributions to swing states that
demonstrate the highest elasticity.208 By elasticity, this Article adopts the definition
coined by the statistician, Nate Silver: “[A]n elastic state . . . [is] one that is rela-
tively sensitive or responsive to changes in political conditions, such as a change in
the national economic mood.”209 For example, if a series of strong job reports are
issued this quarter, and President Donald Trump’s standing in nationwide polling
improves by 4%, his standing is expected to improve by more than four points in an
elastic state, whereas in an inelastic state, his polling numbers might only improve
by one point. Conversely, if a series of negative job reports are issued this quarter
and President Trump’s standing in nationwide polling declines by 4%, he would ex-
perience an even bigger plummet than four points in an elastic state. In an inelastic
state, his polling numbers might only dip by two points.
According to Silver’s formulation, “Elastic states are those which have a lot of
swing voters—that is, voters who could plausibly vote for either party’s candidate.”210
First, he characterizes swing voters as very likely being independent voters, rather than
registered Democrats or Republicans, because more than 90% of registered voters from
either major political party will vote along party lines in most presidential elec-
tions.211 Second, Silver posits that swing voters are “also likely to be devoid of other
204 See supra Part II.
205 See supra Part II.
206 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE
UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2018, tbl.1
(2017), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2010-2017/state/totals/nst
-est2017-01.xlsx [https://perma.cc/XL5V-LPQJ]. Note that Vermont trails Washington, D.C.,
which has no Senators or Congressional Representatives, in population. Id. The combined
population of Vermont, Alaska, and Hawaii trails that of Puerto Rico, whose residents are
citizens of the United States that neither have representation in the U.S. Congress, nor repre-
sentation in the Electoral College. Id.
207 See supra Part II.
208 See supra Part II.
209 Nate Silver, Swing Voters and Elastic States, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 21, 2012), https://
fivethirtyeight.com/features/swing-voters-and-elastic-states/ [https://perma.cc/PE5Z-S6AU].
210 Id.
211 Id.
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characteristics that are very strong predictors of voting behavior.”212 For example,
a swing voter will statistically tend not be a southern evangelical Christian, which is a
trait that very strongly predicts Republican voting in recent years.213 Similarly, a swing
voter is also statistically unlikely to be African American—a trait that strongly
predicts Democratic voting.214
Table 1 identifies the states that are prime targets for non-resident campaign con-
tributors, should they seek to make a concerted, organized effort to influence federal
or state races in those jurisdictions. The identification of these states reflects a two-
step process. First, this author has identified the ten closest Presidential races in 2012
and in 2016, and entered the states that were closely decided in either race: Arizona,
Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin.215 Second, these swing states
have been arranged in three tiers: Tier 1 states are highly elastic; Tier 2 states have aver-
age elasticity; and Tier 3 states are inelastic.216 The elasticity scores217 are derived
from Silver’s data, which relies on the 2016 version of the Cooperative Congressional
Election Study—a survey by Harvard University and YouGov of 60,000-plus people.218
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 See David Catanese, The 10 Closest States in the 2016 Election, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/the-run-2016/articles/2016-11-14/the
-10-closest-states-in-the-2016-election [https://perma.cc/HJ7Z-AJKR]; Chris Cillizza & Aaron
Blake, The 10 Closest States in Election 2012, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2012, 6:30 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2012/11/08/the-10-closest-states-in-election-20
12/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.723ee3705af6 [https://perma.cc/K98B-5FF8].
216 See infra Table 1.
217 Silver explains the elasticity scores in the following way: “If a state has an elasticity of
(for example) 1.1 points, . . . that means a one-percentage-point change in the national numbers
would be expected to change the . . . [state’s] numbers by 1.1 points. Or, likewise, a five-point
change in the national numbers would change that state’s voting preferences by 5.5 points.”
See Silver, supra note 209.
218 See Nathaniel Rakich & Nate Silver, Election Update: The Most (And Least) Elastic
States and Districts, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 6, 2018, 2:22 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com
/features/election-update-the-house-districts-that-swing-the-most-and-least-with-the-national
-mood/ [https://perma.cc/SGB9-PQ98]. Silver describes his methodology for computing states’
elasticity scores:
The scores work by modeling the likelihood of an individual voter having
voted Democratic or Republican for Congress, based on a series of char-
acteristics related to their demographic (race, religion, etc.) and political
(Democrat, Republican, independent, liberal, conservative, etc.) identity.
We then estimate how much that probability would change based on a
shift in the national political environment. The principle is that voters
at the extreme end of the spectrum—those who have close to a 0 percent
or a 100 percent chance of voting for one of the parties, based on our
analysis—don’t swing as much as those in the middle.
Id.
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The three tiers are based on the top, middle, and bottom tertile scores for elas-
ticity.219
Table 1: Swing States that Non-resident Donors Could Target
Tier 1: Highly Elastic
Swing States
Tier 2: Swing States
with Average Elasticity
Tier 3: Inelastic
Swing States
New Hampshire (1.15)
Maine (1.13)
Nevada (1.08)
Iowa (1.08)
Wisconsin (1.07)
Colorado (1.07)
Michigan (1.07)
Arizona (1.05)
Florida (1.03)
Minnesota (1.03)
Ohio (1.02)
Pennsylvania (1.00)
North Carolina (0.98)
Virginia (0.94)
Table 1 demonstrates that states in Tier 1, such as New Hampshire, Maine, and
Nevada, have a fluid electorate. The citizens in these states are most likely to be swayed
by outside phenomena and circumstances.220 Non-resident donors’ individual con-
tributions to political candidates in these states stand the chance of being the most
impactful, assuming that the targeted candidates successfully optimize their cam-
paign contributions.221 Tier 1 states stand the best chance of transforming from
“separate polities” into “platforms for national political struggle.”222 Non-resident
campaign contributors from states like California and New York will be able to
shape federal government races, state governor and attorney general races that
impact redistricting and judicial advocacy on pertinent issues.223 At the same time,
while these states will lose some of their traditional traits of republicanism, their
importance and relevance in the national scheme will remain, albeit more at the
mercy of outside interests.224
On the opposite side of the pendulum, in Tier 3, North Carolina and Virginia—both
large states—represent electorates that are turnout-battle states; in other words, they
lack swing voters, so success in those states is dependent on voter turnout.225 Be-
cause there are fewer swing voters in North Carolina and Virginia, the politicians
in these states are probably more keen on motivating partisans to vote and less likely
219 Seventeen states compose each of the first two tertiles, while sixteen states and
Washington, D.C., compose the third tertile. See Silver, supra note 209.
220 See Rakich & Silver, supra note 218.
221 See Silver, supra note 209.
222 See supra Section III.B; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 155, at 1133.
223 See Silver, supra note 209.
224 See id.
225 See id.
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able to be influenced by outside individual contributors.226 These swing states will
resist straying away from being “separate polities” as long as the Supreme Court
upholds the current protection of out-of-state campaign contributions.227
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of Thompson and the proliferation of campaign contributions
by out-of-state donors in recent federal and state elections, smaller swing states in
the United States are at a crossroads.228 They can remain, in Jessica Bulman-Pozen’s
words, “separate polities,” or continue to transform into “platforms for national poli-
tical struggle” for out-of-state residents.229 If the Supreme Court upholds the ruling
of Thompson, Landell, and VanNatta, or refuses to grant certiorari to Thompson, states’
fight for traditional republicanism could be altered forever.230 Currently, smaller,
swing states may disproportionately impact the national political landscape, but the
prospect of increased out-of-state fundraising could allow citizens of larger, inelastic
states to heavily impact the political races and guide the disproportionate influence
of citizens in those smaller swing states.231 Through data analysis and an adoption
of the concept of state elasticity, a concerted effort by out-of-state individual donors
can maximize political objectives across state lines.232
226 See id.
227 See Briffault, supra note 164, at 69–70.
228 See Thompson v. Hebdon, 909 F.3d 1027, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2018).
229 See supra Section III.B; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 155, at 1133.
230 See supra Part II.
231 See supra Section IV.B.
232 See supra Section IV.B.
